Ethics, Energy, and the Climate of Contempt

Ethics Unwrapped collaborating adviser David Spence—a professor at both the University of Texas School of Law and UT’s McCombs School of Business–has just published an excellent book titled Climate of Contempt: How to Rescue the U.S. Energy Transition from Voter Partisanship (2024), which addresses one of the most important policy challenges we face.

Spence takes as a given (as we think it fair to do) that climate change threatens human prosperity and well-being and that this disaster can be averted only by substantially reducing carbon emissions. Spence argues that “[t]he U.S. economy cannot get to net-zero carbon emissions without national regulatory legislation—‘regulatory’ in the sense of mandating fundamental changes in the behavior of energy-market participants in order to reduce carbon emissions.” (p. 3) Spence’s target audience is those who understand the desperate need for action–the “climate coalition.” He diagnoses the roadblocks to this necessary governmental action and suggests a feasible path to enacting needed regulation of carbon emissions.

As Spence points out, this energy transition implicates numerous normative moral issues, such as: “How much of the blame for carbon emissions should we lay at the feet of individual consumers? How much should we lay at the feet of fossil-fuel companies? Utilities? Or politicians?” He addresses these ethical questions through various lenses (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) (pp. 193-199), but they are not the focus of this blog post.

As usual, we emphasize the psychological aspects of decision making. In explaining why people have come to believe what they do about the climate, how social media has contributed to our tremendous political polarization over so many issues such as climate change, and how the climate coalition might best gain the adherents necessary to bring the needed regulatory change, Spence references many of the psychological forces that can cause poor decision making that we so often study here at Ethics Unwrapped—the fundamental attribution error, loss aversion, the in-group/out-group bias, the confirmation bias, the overconfidence bias, motivated reasoning, cognitive dissonance, framing, groupthink, the self-serving bias, rationalizations, and others. Hence, our interest in summarizing Spence’s arguments, though they are sufficiently complex that we cannot possibly do them complete justice.

In Chapter 1, Spence reminds us that Congress was not always paralyzed by bitter partisanship. Between 1970 and 1990, with mostly Republicans in the White House and Democrats controlling Congress, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act and many other pieces of landmark environmental legislation were enacted. However, despite the surprising passage in 2022 of the decidedly pro-climate Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), to most observers it seems unrealistic today to expect passage of the necessary climate legislation absent an unlikely Democratic sweep of the November 2024 elections.

In Chapter 2, Spence explores the origins of the deregulatory movement of the past 30 years. Spence is a co-author of the nation’s leading energy law textbook and in this chapter, the reader cannot help but learn a vast amount about the energy industry and energy regulation. Spence notes that perfectly respectable conservative economic theories provided much of the momentum behind the deregulatory movement, but that the theories have not worn well over the years, especially in light of the exigencies presented by the climate crisis. While structural features of our democracy favor efforts by industry interest groups, lobbyists, dark money, and conservative federal judges to block environmental reform, reforms are nonetheless possible when “republican moments” arise—moments when large numbers of people engage in serious political discussion, focusing on the moral good and overcoming the normal institutional constraints that so often thwart progress.

In Chapter 3, Spence diagnoses the causes of today’s hyper-partisanship. He notes that in the early part of this century many influential Republicans recognized the need for climate legislation and even co-sponsored climate bills. But today Republicans and Democrats have never been farther apart ideologically: “For the strongest partisans, winning elections and policy fights has become a moral imperative, which has led to more party unity and discipline as well as more frequent use of countermajoritarian institutions such as the filibuster to stop the other party from getting what it wants.” (p. 96)

Spences marshals mountains of data from academic studies, demonstrating that both parties have become more extreme, although the Republicans more so, and that this has had dire effects. “Before the Civil War, voters and politicians subordinated policy preferences to the moral imperative of attaining political power. And that seems to be their priority today.” (p. 117)

Social science research highlights the emergence of “partisan tribalism” in American politics:

Twenty-first century partisanship in the United States has become much more affective—more of an expression of group identity than an expression of policy preferences or a governance philosophy. For more and more voters, their partisan identity is also negative—focused on preventing the other party from realizing its goals. Affective, negative partisanship offers incentives for GOP politicians to oppose Democrats’ policy objectives even if they are popular. Opposing the other party’s initiatives is a way of pleasing negative partisans, regardless of the content of those initiatives. (p. 119)

Two-thirds of Americans support Democratic views on climate change legislation, and Spence quotes historian Timothy Snyder’s observation that “when a party’s policy proposals are relatively unpopular, it ‘must either fear democracy or weaken it.’” (p. 123) Hence the extreme gerrymandering, voter suppression, and admiration for autocrats that have become prominent features of Republican politics. This has created a democracy-threatening atmosphere where too many members of both parties view violence as an acceptable method for opposing the other party’s efforts.

Chapter 4 “explores modern information technology as a hyperefficient propaganda machine—a conduit for misinformation, a trigger of negative emotion, and a driver of political dysfunction.” (p. 125) Spence again relies heavily on academic research and concludes that this “[r]esearch confirms that partisan tribalism is driven in large part by the online spread of propaganda.” (p. 129) Modern ideological media was pioneered by Rush Limbaugh and Fox News, who developed the model of “news” and punditry by which we caricature and demonize one another. Then along came social media, which allowed the right and the left alike to divide into tribes whose very identities depend largely on their political views. The left had the advantage of having the vast majority of climate scientists on their side, but it was easy for the right to simply decide that being expert is a bad thing, not a good thing. Social media enabled both sides to retreat to their respective silos and talk only to people with whom they already agreed. Though studies routinely show that conservatives are more prone than others to believing conspiracy theories, folks at both ends of the political spectrum have proved close-minded to opposing views and uninterested in productive dialogue with political opponents.

Liberal media (e.g., John Stewart’s The Daily Show) made great fun of conservatives’ anti-science views, but Fox News then skillfully exploited that ridicule. Says Spence: “From its inception, Fox News programming has shown a particularly sophisticated understanding of how social-emotional forces shape political belief. The network understands rural viewers’ sense that urban, liberal, professional elites look down upon them. They’re laughing at you, but don’t worry. We have your back—you, the real Americans.” (p. 146)

Psychological forces such as the confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, the self-serving bias, cognitive dissonance, the overconfidence bias, and others have led both conservatives and liberals to hunker down in their respective trenches listening only to their own allies and not at all interested in examining their own beliefs with a critical eye. Both sides talk past each other. Spence quotes Jesse Bernstein, who wrote: “No one learned anything; no one engaged with an idea, and nothing outside of a very specific set of ideas was given any real credence.” (p. 157)

In this atmosphere, misinformation flourishes. Spence observes:

For example, one of the more persistent purveyors of climate misinformation is the former Trump environmental adviser Steve Milloy, who told his 123,400 Twitter/X followers in 2023 that “NOAA makes it official. Last 8 years…global cooling.” What the NOAA’s update actually said is that “all six major global temperature datasets used for analysis in the report agree that the last eight years (2015-22) were the eight warmest on record.” (p. 158)

For their part, science experts, feeling an urgent need to convince voters and public officials of the necessity of swift and dramatic climate action, often find themselves exaggerating climate evidence and inappropriately “sand[ing] the inconvenient edges off the facts.” (p. 159) Spence urges these experts to follow historian Timothy Snyder’s admonition to take responsibility for what they communicate to others, and Nikki Haley’s warning to young Republicans: “I know that it’s fun [to try to “own the Libs” online] and that it can feel good, but …are you persuading anyone?” (p. 163)

Discouragingly, Spence wraps up Chapter 4 by repeating that we have “an entire ideological media industry” that is devoted to convincing each side of the debate that the other side is not only wrong but also immoral and he argues that focusing on the villainy of the other side keeps both liberals and conservatives from thinking clearly on climate and other issues.

In Chapter 5, Spence explains in detail how this toxic information environment misleads us about the complexities of creating an energy supply that is reliable, affordable, and clean all at the same time. Spence notes: “Cognitive biases push experts and lay people alike to balance these three objectives in ways that are influenced by their respective political philosophies—their views on the relative virtues of markets and regulation, intuitions about the effectiveness of different policy levers, and beliefs about how regulatory politics works.” (p. 166) Spence “suggests keeping our eyes on the prize: namely, stabilizing and reducing atmospheric carbon. We are more likely to build durable voter support for the transition and to minimize its opportunity costs by leaving all net-zero options open, by discussing trade-offs openly and frankly, and by engaging critical questions rather than dismissing them or attacking the questioner.” (pp. 166-167)

Spence begins his final chapter with a lengthy summary of his key ideas:

Hyperefficient information technology amplifies partisan tribalism by making it harder for voters to understand complex policy problems, harder for experts to explore that complexity publicly, and easier for partisan opportunists to manipulate voters and fan their fears and resentments. Constant appeals to moral outrage preach mostly to the choir and do not resonate with swing voters. Worse, those appeals are used to mobilize adversaries instantly, enhancing the appeal of vague conspiratorial explanations for unwanted political outcomes. As identity-based group contempt grows to dangerous levels, it weakens the liberal democratic institutions through which we must craft solutions to national problems such as climate change. Those institutions require care and maintenance, which require some minimum threshold amount of respect for pluralism (across social and political groups). Many now worry that we are falling below that threshold. (p. 201)

Spence recommends that members of the climate coalition jettison identity politics and focus on “sustained in-person communication across ideological boundaries as a way to break the spell of contempt and of firm but mistaken belief.” (p. 203) He reminds climate coalition members that they themselves are subject to being overconfident in their views and resistant to opposing evidence. He urges conversations, not preaching. And that coalition members be curious, not judgmental, always looking for common understanding with climate doubters.

Realistically, climate coalition members are unlikely to convert many MAGA members. They must be prepared for many disappointments. But Spence explores the social science research on persuasion and believes that with the proper approach climate coalition members have a fighting chance to convert enough persuadable voters in the national electorate to cast ballots on issues rather than identities in order to create the republican moment necessary “to move beyond the climate of contempt to create a durable, lower-carbon energy future.” (p. 240)

Let us hope that Spence’s optimism is warranted. We share his belief that we all have a moral obligation to be open-minded, to avoid overconfidence in our own views, and to engage with the facts rather than conspiracy theories or personal attacks on those who do not share our views.

Sources:

Jesse Bernstein, “How Jon Stewart’s Culture of Ridicule Left America Unprepared for Donald Trump,” Tablet Magazine, August 9, 2016, at https://sections/news/articles/how-jon-stewart’s-culture-of-ridicule-left-america-unprepared-for-donald-trump.

Aaron Blake, “Nikki Haley Warns Against ‘Owning the Libs,’” Washington Post, July 24, 2018, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/24/nikki-haley-warns-against-owning-the-libs-thats-basically-trumps-entire-political-strategy/.

Dan Cassino et al., “What Your Know Depends on What You Watch: Current Events Knowledge Across Popular News Sources,” Public Mind Poll, Farleigh Dickinson University, at http://publicmind.fdu/2012/confirmed/final.pdf.

Pew Research Center, “What the Data Says about Americans’ Views on Climate Change,” Aug. 9, 2023, at https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/08/09/what-the-data-says-about-americans-views-of-climate-change/.

James Gray Pope, “Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 139, No. 2 (Dec. 1990), 287-368, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3312284.pdf.

David B. Spence, Climate of Contempt: How to Rescue the U.S. Energy Transition from Voter Partisanship (2024).

David B. Spence et al., Energy, Economics and the Environment (6^th ed. 2023).